The Hanford nuclear reservation has been lax in tracking and sometimes its sale of property that has the potential to be useful for overseas military or nuclear proliferation, according to the Department of Energy Office of Inspector General.
There also was the risk that military-style equipment could have been pilfered because it was not properly tracked after it was set for disposal, it said in a report on how high risk or sensitive property was accounted for that was released Tuesday.
The IG report looked at shortcomings by recent contractor Mission Support Alliance, or MSA.
But it said the Office of Inspector General also was concerned that when Hanford Mission Integration Solutions started as the new Hanford site services contractor a year ago, it adopted the same policies and procedures.
The report said that in various checks of items of concern, 88% to 99% were not appropriately flagged in Hanford databases. They included items that could be considered high risk; had export control restrictions because they had potential for military or nuclear proliferation use; or were used to process data that could be sensitive to U.S. security.
The incomplete recordkeeping created potential problems in the disposal of the items, the report said.
It found that MSA put 64 computers that were under export control restrictions up for public auction without required export restriction notices.
The inspection also found 228 Hanford Patrol items that fell under export control restrictions but lacked evidence that they were destroyed in a manner that prevented their reuse or their identification as being used as part of Hanford security systems.
They included 140 pieces of body armor that the contractor sent to a public garbage disposal company for secure burial without destroying first, plus items such as riflescopes, respirators, night vision goggles and a Kevlar helmet that were not verified as destroyed.
“Improperly dispositioned items (e.g., riflescopes, night vision goggles, and intact body armor) are highly desirable and easily pilfered,” the report said.
In another example, it said that Hanford Patrol items were sent to an electronics recycling vendor without required restriction notices, although handwritten notes attached to each indicated they were sensitive items.
The items included a spotting scope, night vision goggles and two laser range finders.
Proper documentation assures that recipients understand the sensitivity or restrictions on materials from the Department of Energy, the report said.
MSA also could not always provide evidence that it sanitized or destroyed excess hard drives from the Hanford site before disposal.
The Hanford nuclear reservation adjacent to Richland in Eastern Washington was used from World War II through the Cold War to produce plutonium for the nation’s nuclear weapons program.
As environmental cleanup of radioactive and other chemical waste and contamination continues at the Eastern Washington site, the Hanford Patrol provides 24-hour security.
Hanford improvements underway
The IG report split the blame for shortcomings between MSA and DOE.
DOE failed to provide adequate oversight of its contractor’s high risk and sensitive property program and was unaware that MSA was not following federal requirements, the report said.
One DOE official told inspectors that spot checks of hard drive sanitation records were done.
But DOE did not require MSA to submit records to show hard drives had been scrubbed clean of information when it reviewed proposals to dispose of items. It instead relied on verbal assurances that records were kept and could be verified, the report said.
That was despite a 2016 internal Department of Finance Division assessment that found the contractor could not provide sanitation records for nine of 10 items reviewed.
“By not acting on that finding, the department missed the opportunity to identify the extent that MSA’s records were incomplete,” the IG report said.
DOE also did not have access to the Hanford Patrol’s property inventory, which limited the visibility of MSA’s management of high risk and sensitive property, the report said.
DOE told the Office of Inspector General in December that it would direct its new contractor, Hanford Mission Integration Solutions, to develop new policies and procedures to identify, track and dispose of high risk and sensitive property.
At the time the new contractor was already updating procedures and was identifying, tagging or disposing of the property as necessary, according to DOE. The work is scheduled to be completed in June.
DOE also said it is starting monthly visits by a DOE property administrator with Hanford Mission Integration Solutions to discuss property management actions and to physically review excess property.
DOE also was working to make sure contractors and DOE employees understand which property is considered to have higher risk, it told inspectors.
