News / Nation & World

Radio problems a factor in 19 Arizona firefighters’ deaths

Report does not assign blame, which disappoints families

The Columbian

Published: September 28, 2013, 5:00pm

A tearful Shari Turbyfill listens to a panel announce its findings as the official report on the Arizona firefighter deaths is released Saturday in Prescott, Ariz. Her stepson, Travis Turbyfill, died fighting the Yarnell wildfire.

PRESCOTT, Ariz. — A three-month investigation into the June deaths of 19 Arizona firefighters found that the men ceased radio communication for a half-hour before they were killed in a wildfire blaze, but did not assign fault. Some family members say that reluctance could put other lives in danger.

The 120-page report released Saturday found that proper procedure was followed in the worst firefighting tragedy since Sept. 11, 2001. Investigators suggested that the state of Arizona should possibly update its guidelines and look into better tracking technology.

All but one member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots crew died June 30 while protecting the town of Yarnell, about 80 miles northwest of Phoenix, from an erratic, lightning-sparked wildfire. Hotshots are elite backcountry firefighters who hike deep into the brush to fight blazes.

While maintaining a neutral tone, the investigation cited badly programmed radios, vague updates, and a 33-minute communication blackout while the men hiked out of their safe zone to the spot where they were eventually overcome by the fire. Though the report points to multiple failures, investigators did not ask whether the deaths could have been avoided, raising questions about what lessons firefighters will be able to take from the tragedy.

At a news conference in Prescott, where the firefighters lived, Shari Turbyfill implored officials to draw stronger conclusions about why her stepson and his comrades died, and recommend immediate changes. “Your protection of us is killing us,” she said. “We’re willing to take the heat right now, but I don’t want another family to deal with this.”

Her husband, David, said the command center should never have lost track of his 27-year-old son, Travis.

“You have to look at communications and GPS devices,” he said.

The report, produced by a team of local, state and federal fire experts, is the first minute-to-minute account of the fatal afternoon.

The command center did not find out the men were surrounded by flames and fighting for their lives until five minutes before they deployed their emergency shelters, more than a half-hour after a weather warning was issued.

Without guidance from the command center or their lookout, who had escaped after warning the crew, the men bushwhacked into a canyon that soon turned into a bowl of fire. The topography whipped up 70-foot flames that bent parallel and licked the ground, producing 2,000-degree heat. Fire shelters, always a dreaded last resort, start to melt at 1,200 degrees.

As the flames overcame the men, a large air tanker was hovering above, trying to determine their location.

The firefighters may have failed to communicate during that crucial half hour because they entered a dead zone, or because they were wary of overloading the radio channels. It’s not unusual for backcountry firefighters to go out of touch for chunks of time.

Meanwhile, residents were evacuating and other crews were being pulled back, creating a “complex, busy, hectic situation,” said lead investigator Jim Karels.

The investigators recommended that Arizona officials review their communications procedures and look into new technologies, including GPS. But they stopped short of saying the technology would have saved lives.

Ted Putnam, a former fire investigator for the U.S. Forest Service, said the report should have taken a harder look at the hotshot culture and the choices made by the crew.

“What I’m arguing really went wrong is in the decision area,” he said.

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